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The Medicare Appeals Crisis:  
Why Mediation is the Medicine 
Michelle Ellis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
From the United States’ first federally financed health care program in 
1798,1 to recent Affordable Care Act changes, the country has borne 
considerable directional shifts in health law policies to meet the demands of 
an advancing society.  While typically such transformative demands call for 
government intervention, sometimes it is the government intervention itself 
that triggers transformative demands. 
Today’s Medicare program stands at the forefront of the surging federal 
debate on health care reform.  In 2014, Medicare spending accounted for 
14% of the federal budget.2  Medicare currently insures 55 million 
Americans3 —15% of the population.4  By 2037, it is expected to account 
for the health care of 80 million people.5  As the demographic wave of baby-
boomers become eligible for Medicare in the first half of the twenty-first 
century and as the recession-induced boost in Social Security Disability 
Insurance elevates the number of Americans now qualifying for Medicare,6 
the tremendous growth rate necessitates major changes in the federal budget 
regarding how and what the program provides.  This inevitable Medicare 
 
*  Juris Doctor Candidate 2016, Pepperdine University School of Law. 
 1. Rick Ungar, Congress Passes Socialized Medicine and Mandates Health Insurance in 
1798, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2011/01/17/congress-passes-
socialized-medicine-and-mandates-health-insurance-in-1798/. 
 2. The Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing: Overview of Medicare Spending, THE 
HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 24, 2015), http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-
spending-and-financing-fact-sheet/. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Megan Multack & Claire Noel-Miller, Who Relies on Medicare? Profile of the Medicare 
Population, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., (Jan. 2014), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/ 
public_policy_institute/health/2014/who-relies-on-medicare-fact-sheet-2014-AARP-ppi-health.pdf. 
 5.  Mark Trumbull, Taming Medicare Costs: What are the Options?, D.C. DECODER (Apr. 2, 
2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2013/0402/Taming-Medicare-costs-What-are-
the-options. 
 6. Philip Moeller, Here’s What You Need to Know About the Serious Backlog of Medicare 
Appeals, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 6, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/serious-
backlog-medicare-claims-appeals/. 
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expansion has already begun to overwhelm the federal financing 
mechanisms that support it, and although such transformative demands have 
sparked various forms of government intervention, such as establishing 
Medicare Recovery Audit Contractors (RACs), this recent government 
intervention has actually aggravated the problems surrounding Medicare,7 
calling for drastic changes in order to prevent the collapse of one of the most 
important federal programs for American citizens.  Though modestly 
explored in the Medicare arena, alternative dispute resolution is emerging as 
the optimal forum for resolving these recent coverage disputes. 
This article will explore how unmeritorious RAC-reversals recently 
polluted the Medicare appeals process, and how this has led to a crisis for 
both providers and the United States Department of Health & Human 
Services (HHS).  Furthermore, this article will consider the lack of available 
remedies and narrow measures taken by HHS, and will instead advocate for 
mediation as the best means of easing the backlog.  While the delays also 
directly affect Medicare beneficiaries, this article will limit its discussion to 
the backlog in relation to providers and suppliers. 
II.  THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 
Congress established the Medicare program in 1965 in an effort to 
provide health insurance primarily to individuals sixty-five years and older.8  
Although the objective of this federal program is to ensure that beneficiaries 
have access to health care,9 “the Medicare program does not cover all health 
care expenses.”10  Title XVIII, also known as the Medicare Act, grants the 
federal government authority to determine what medical services are 
provided to beneficiaries and to accordingly award and deny reimbursements 
to medical providers.11  Medical “providers” typically include hospitals, 
home health agencies, outpatient rehabilitation facilities, skilled nursing 
facilities, and hospices.12  The Medicare statutes and regulations strictly 
 
 7. RAC Auditing Reform is Essential to Fix Urgent, Critical Problems, AM. HOSP. ASS’N 
(2014), www.aha.org/content/14/issuebrief-rac.pdf. (“The influx of appeals of RAC denials has 
broken the Medicare appeals process.”). 
 8. Social Security Act, Title XVIII, Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 
79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396v). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims Appeal Procedures, 67 Fed. Reg. 
69,312, 69,313 (proposed Nov. 15, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 405). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2014). 
 12. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims Appeal Procedures, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
69,336. 
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define the parties who may appeal a determination of denied coverage and 
provide lengthy procedural guidelines for such process.13 
A.  Four-Step Appeals Process 
When medical providers furnish services to a Medicare patient, they 
submit a reimbursement claim to a Medicare Administrative Contractor 
(MAC), who then conducts an initial evaluation of the claim.14  These 
government contractors are responsible for processing Medicare claims and 
appropriately reimbursing medical providers who have furnished covered 
medical care to Medicare beneficiaries.15  Upon review, MACs either pay or 
deny the medical provider’s claim for reimbursement.16  If dissatisfied, a 
provider may return a denied claim to the MAC again, and is entitled to a 
redetermination within sixty days.17  A provider may then appeal the MAC’s 
decision to a Qualified Independent Contractor (QIC), who is likewise 
required to issue a decision within the statutory sixty-day time period.18  
These first two levels of review have been characterized as “a little more 
than rubber stamps” due to the fact that less than 5% of coverage denials are 
actually reversed at those levels.19 
The Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA) oversees a third 
level of review, which allows providers to request a hearing before an 
 
 13. See 42 C.F.R. § 422.578 (2004) (limiting the right to appeal to parties of an organization 
determination); 42 C.F.R. § 422.566 (2004) (defining “parties to an organization determination”). 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a)(2)(A) (2014).  CMS contracted with an entity called Medicare 
Administrative Contractors (MAC) to serve as the “fiscal intermediary” for claims under this statute.  
See Medicare Contracting Reform to Replace Carriers and Fiscal Intermediaries, AM. ACAD. OF 
PHYS. MED. & REHAB. (2015), https://www.aapmr.org/practice/resources/regulatory/Pages/Medi 
care-Contracting-Reform-Replace-Carriers-Fiscal-Intermediaries.aspx.  
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk-1(a)(4)(A) (2015). 
 16. Id. § 1395kk-1(a)(4)(A)-(B). 
 17. Id. § 1395ff(a)(3)(C)(ii) (2014). 
 18. Id. § 1395ff(c)(3)(C)(i). 
 19. Daniel Hettich, Medicare Beneficiaries Sue HHS Over 489-Day Backlog in ALJ Appeals, 
KING & SPALDING HEALTH HEADLINES (Sept. 2, 2014), 
http://www.kslaw.com/library/newsletters/HealthHeadlines/2014/0902/article5.html.  “Despite the 
overwhelming likelihood of failure at these first two levels, their completion is a necessary condition 
to obtaining review at the ALJ level.”  Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Mandamus Relief 
at 6, Lessler v. Burwell, No. 3:14-cv-01230 (D. Conn. Aug. 26, 2014), 
http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/00083998.pdf [hereinafter Lessler 
Complaint] (noting the one exception for ALJ review when the statutory adjudication period for 
reconsideration has expired without a decision). 
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Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).20  This stage is particularly important to 
providers, suppliers, and beneficiaries because it is the only level of review 
where parties have the right to an independent adjudicator and to a live 
hearing—namely, the opportunity to call witnesses.21  Moreover, at the ALJ 
level, “denial of coverage is generally reversed at least half the time.”22  By 
statute, Congress has directed that the ALJ must hold the hearing and render 
a decision within ninety days.23  If still dissatisfied, a provider may appeal to 
the Departmental Appeals Board (DAB), where the Medicare Appeals 
Council appointed by the Secretary of HHS will review the ALJs decision 
and offer a decision within ninety days.24 
A “fifth” constructive level of review includes an escalation option, 
where providers have the right to escalate their claims to federal courts if the 
claim meets a certain amount in controversy, and if the providers have 
exhausted all administrative remedies within HHS.25  However, if their claim 
does not meet the amount in controversy requirement for escalation or the 
administrative remedies are delayed by a surge in appeals, then providers 
have no choice but to wait it out.26 
 
 20. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, § 931(b)(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 2398 (2003) (“The Secretary shall assure the 
independence of administrative law judges . . . In order to assure such independence, the Secretary 
shall place such judges in an administrative office that is organizationally and functionally separate 
from [CMS].”) 
 21. Hettich, supra note 19.  “Only the third level, the administrative law judge (ALJ) level, 
provides the right to an oral hearing before the adjudicator, including witness testimony, allows a 
beneficiary to present his or her case with more than written evidence and argument, and provides 
the only opportunity for meaningful review.”  Lessler Complaint, supra note 19, at 1.  Beneficiaries 
may submit new evidence for the ALJs to consider de novo based on the Medicare statute and 
regulations, “unlike the contractors and QICs who rely on less formal and more restrictive guidelines 
and directives.”  Id. at 7. 
 22. Hettich, supra note 19. 
 23. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1016(a) (2010). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(2) (2014); 42 C.F.R.§ 405.1108(a) (2005). 
 25. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1132 (2010); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1100(d) (2010).  Because the Medicare 
statute states that a claimant “may” escalate an appeal to the MAC’s, CMS has interpreted “may” as 
exempting OMHA from the ninety-day deadline.  Amy Lerman & Robert Wanerman, OMHA’s 
Second Medicare Appellant Forum Reveals Some Forward Momentum but No Simpler or Quick 
Solutions for Medicare Administrative Appeals Backlog, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN: HEALTH CARE 
AND LIFE SCI. ALERT (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.ebglaw.com/publications/omhas-second-medicare-
appellant-forum-reveals-some-forward-momentum-but-no-simple-or-quick-solutions-for-medicare-
administrative-appeals-backlog/.  CMS claims that the Medicare statute contemplates the possibility 
that not all claims at the ALJ or DAB levels will be decided within ninety days, and thus merely 
provides a remedy for those claims, not time restraints imposed on every claim.  Id. 
 26. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1132(b); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1006(c) (2010); Medicare Appeals: Adjustment 
to the Amount in Controversy Threshold Amounts for Calendar Year 2014, 78 Fed. Reg. 59702-01, 
59703 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
4
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B.  Post Payment Review by RACs 
In theory, all levels of the Medicare administrative review process 
should be completed within about one year; however, in recent practice, the 
pipeline has become so clogged with appeals at the ALJ level that pursuing a 
claim extends far beyond the timeframes established by the Medicare Act.27  
It all started when Congress introduced a RAC for the purpose of recouping 
Medicare “overpayments.”28  Since 2009, the first two levels of 
reimbursement review, which are governed by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS), have utilized these third-party contractors to 
conduct an additional level of post-payment review.29  The RACs had 
jurisdiction over all providers that fell within their designated geographical 
scope, despite the practice area.30  This program subjected formerly paid 
reimbursement determinations to future auditing and reversals by RACs—
including those claims dating as far back as three years.31  Though first 
introduced as a check to ensure the honesty and accuracy of provider-
claims,32 the RACs have proven to be a very effective force for CMS, 
 
 27. Hall Render, Health Law Year in Review: Here’s What Happened in 2014 as We Launch 
into 2015, HALL RENDER BLOG (Jan. 7, 2015), http://blogs.hallrender.com/blog/health-law-year-in-
review-heres-what-happened-in-2014-as-we-launch-into-2015-2/. 
 28. Recovery Auditing in Medicare and Medicaid for Fiscal Year 2012: FY 2012 Report to 
Congress as Required by Section 1893(h) of the Social Security Act and Section 6411(c) of the 
Affordable Care Act, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., at iv-v, 26-27, 
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-
Compliance-Programs/Recovery-Audit-Program/Downloads/Report-To-Congress-Recovery-
Auditing-in-Medicare-and-Medicaid-for-Fiscal-Year-2012_013114.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) 
[hereinafter Recovery Auditing in Medicare and Medicaid for FY 2012]. 
 29. Medicare Improper Payment Review: Recovery Auditor Contractors (RAC), AM. C. 
PHYSICIANS, http://www.acponline.org/running_practice/payment_coding/medicare/pay_review_ra 
c.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2015). 
 30. Health Care Alert: The Changing Landscape of Medicare’s RAC Program: Auditing 
Announcements You May Have Missed, STRADLEY RONON (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://www.stradley.com/insights/publications/2014/03/health-care-alert-march-2014the-changing-
landsca__.  In 2014, CMS created an audit team to exclusively review claims from home health, 
hospice, and durable medical equipment providers under the rationale that “a specialized RAC will 
develop expertise and efficiently audit this subset of providers.”  Id. 
 31. Id.; Statement of Work for the Medicare Fee-for-Service Recovery Audit Program, at 9, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Monitoring-Programs/recovery-audit-program/downloads/090111RACFinSOW.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2015). 
 32. Recovery Auditing in Medicare and Medicaid for FY 2012, supra note 28, at 26-27. 
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recouping $36 billion in “improper” fee-for-service payments in 2013.33  But 
at some point, this scheme transcends efficiency, and precipitates disaster. 
Most commonly, RACs overturn payments for inpatient coding when 
the RAC determines that the provider could have furnished appropriate care 
on an outpatient hospital basis.34  In making these sorts of determinations, 
RACs are questioning the medical judgment of health care providers and 
denying claims for services that qualify for the most expensive 
reimbursements.  Interestingly, RACs are paid based on the amount of 
reimbursements that they recover by reversing “improper” payments to 
providers,35 incentivizing the contractors to maximize reversals, including 
legitimate claims.  In a 2013 study by the American Hospital Association 
(AHA), hospitals reported that when they appealed RAC denials, they were 
overturned 72% of the time, and as of a March 30, 2015 survey, hospitals 
reported appealing 45% of all RAC denials.36 
Not surprisingly, many providers blame the RAC program for the surge 
of unprocessed appeals.  Before the implementation of RACs in 2009, there 
were 35,831 appeals at the ALJ level.37  In just four years, the number of 
appeals to ALJs has increased nearly tenfold, reaching 384,151 appeals in 
 
 33. Senate Committee Urges CMS to Refine Audit Procedures to Prevent Improper Payments, 
Reduce Provider Burden, NELSON MULLINS (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nelsonmullins.com/ 
newsletters/cms-urged-to-refine-audit-procedures. 
 34. CMS RAC Status Document: Status Report on the Use of Recovery Audit Contractors in 
the Medicare Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., at 12 (Feb. 2008), 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/recovery-audit-
program/downloads/2007RACStatusDocument.pdf.  Afraid of being denied inpatient payments for 
short stays, hospitals often keep patients longer than necessary in order to guarantee reimbursement 
for the necessary outpatient services.  Render, supra note 27   Consequently, outpatients sustain 
greater out-of-pocket costs than if they had been admitted as inpatients.  Id.  CMS has recently 
attempted to clarify inpatient coding standards by establishing the “Two-Midnight Rule,” which 
provides that when a physician anticipates the patient-stay to cross at least two midnights and admits 
the patient on such basis, then inpatient admissions is appropriate.  Id. 
 35. Senate Committee Urges CMS to Refine Audit Procedures to Prevent Improper Payments, 
Reduce Provider Burden, supra note 33. 
 36. Results of AHA RACTrac Survey, 1st Quarter 2013, AM. HOSP. ASS’N RACTRAC, at 55 
(June 1, 2013), http://www.aha.org/content/13/13q1ractracresults.pdf; Results of AHA RACTrac 
Survey, 4th Quarter 2014, AM. HOSP. ASS’N RACTRAC, at 33 (Mar. 30, 2015), 
http://www.aha.org/content/15/14q4ractracresults.pdf (stating that of the 88,705 completed appeals 
reported, 69% were overturned in favor of the provider).  Similarly, in an April 2015 hearing before 
the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, Senator Hatch testified that at least 60 percent of appeals are 
found in favor of defendants, and questioned how initial decisions are being made and whether 
providers are facing undue burdens.  Wachler & Associates, P.C., Senate Finance Committee 
Examines Medicare Appeals Backlog, WACHLER & ASSOC. HEALTH LAW BLOG (May 19, 2015), 
http://www.wachlerblog.com/2015/05/senate-finance-committee-examines-medicare-appeals-
backlog.html. 
 37. Important Notice Regarding Adjudication Timeframes, Office of Medicare Hearings and 
Appeals, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://www.hhs.gov/omha/important_notice_regarding_adjudication_timeframes.html. 
6
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2013.38  The ALJs have not been able to keep up with this dense volume of 
appeals, dealing with a 300% increased workload from 2012 to 2013.39  Of 
the 363,889 appeals filed in 2013, only 79,374 were actually decided.40  The 
backlog appeared to worsen during the beginning of 2014, with OMHA 
receiving more than 15,000 appeals per week.41  Consequently, 800,000 
claims remain stagnant at the ALJ level, as providers wait an average of 547 
days to find out of they will be paid for services already rendered to 
Medicare beneficiaries.42  The total value of the RAC-denied claims 
languishing at this level remains well over $1 billion,43 which includes 
individual providers with payments up to $200 million locked-up in the 
process.44 
This delay within the four-step administrative appeals process is 
postponing medical provider’s appeal adjudications years beyond the 
timeframe prescribed by Congress.  While the ALJs’ overall productivity 
more than doubled from 2009 to 2013,45 the volume of the increased 
workload seriously defeated OMHA’s capacity to timely adjudicate 
incoming appeals.  As of July 2014, it took an average of 489 days for an 
ALJ to issue a decision.46  Not only does such delay plainly violate the 
statutes, but it also contradicts the very purpose of the Medicare appeals 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Medicare Appellant Forum, OFFICE OF MEDICARE HEARINGS AND APPEALS, at 9 (Feb. 12, 
2014), http://www.hhs.gov/omha/omha_medicare_appellant_forum.html.  See also Rich Marotti, A 
Report and Analysis on the OMHA Medicare Appellant Forum and the Suspension of ALJ Hearings 
for Medicare Providers (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/ 
aba_health_esource/2013-14/april/omha_medicare.html.  
 40. Medicare Appellant Forum, supra note 39. 
 41. Id.  As of February 2014, OMHA received more than 15,000 appeals per week, totaling 
377,900 appeals.  Id.  Only 87,266 were decided at that time.  Id.  Of note, sources have reported a 
span of twenty to twenty-four weeks before OMHA entered new appeals onto its docket, prompting 
a notice to claimants stating: “If 22 weeks have not lapsed since you submitted your Request for 
Hearing, do not resubmit your request.”  Moeller, supra note 6. 
 42. Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals Workloads: Hearing Before the United States H. 
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Health Care & Entitlements, 
113th Cong. 3 (2014) (statement of Chief Judge Nancy J. Griswold) [hereinafter Griswold 
Statement], http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CMS-Griswold-OMHA-
Final.pdf (reporting over 800,000 unprocessed appeals as of July 1, 2014.) [http://perma.cc/B48Z-
PBVG]; James Swann, Medicare Appeals Backlog Could Be Reduced by Restructuring Process, 
Senator Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.bna.com/medicare-appeals-backlog-
n17179925933/. 
 43. Results of AHA RACTrac Survey, 4th Quarter 2014, supra note 36, at 20. 
 44. Senate Committee Urges CMS to Refine Audit Procedures to Prevent Improper Payments, 
Reduce Provider Burden, supra note 33. 
 45. Griswold Statement, supra note 42. 
 46. Hettich, supra note 19. 
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process.47  Without proper adjudications, hospitals cannot recover the 
Medicare reimbursement to which they are entitled for claims that were 
improperly denied. 
C.  Effect of the Current Moratorium 
In December 2013, OMHA announced a temporary moratorium, 
suspending the assignment of most new provider requests for an ALJ 
hearing.48  During the anticipated two-year-suspension,49 OMHA stated that 
it intends to work through the backlog of 357,000 claims that were 
previously assigned to the sixty-five ALJs.50  Once the moratorium is lifted, 
providers will still have to wait for the actual hearing and rendering of an 
ALJ decision on their claims.51  For providers, this means they must repay 
charges that were initially reimbursed by Medicare, knowing their appeal 
will not be decided at the ALJ level for as long as five years.  Because 
Medicare beneficiaries make up 16% of the population, and 40% of those 
beneficiaries are living with three or more chronic conditions, such delay is 
devastating to hospitals that seriously rely on this Medicare 
reimbursement.52  As of June 2015, the moratorium has only further polluted 
the backlog with over 870,000 pending appeals, depriving hospitals of funds, 
and leaving them deeply out-of-pocket for services already rendered to their 
 
 47. Letter from Donald May, Exec. Vice President of Payment & Healthcare Delivery Policy, 
AdvaMed, to Kathleen Sebelius Secretary, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., and Marilyn Tavenner, 
Administrator of CMS, at 1 (Mar. 27, 2014), http://advamed.org/res/472/office-of-medicare-hearing-
and-appeals-decision-to-suspend-assignment-of-new-request-for-administrative-law-judge-hearings-
for-adjudication-of-appeals.  OMHA delays alone have far exceeded the total compliance time 
prescribed for all five levels of review.  Moeller, supra note 6. 
 48. Debra A. McCurdy, Medicare Appeals Backlog Prompts Hold on New Provider Appeals, 
HEALTH INDUS. WASH. WATCH, (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.healthindustrywashingtonwatch.com 
/2014/01/articles/other-hhs-developments/medicare-appeals-backlog-prompts-hold-on-new-
provider-appeals/. 
 49. Lessler Complaint, supra note 19, at 17 (“[W]ith the current backlog we do not expect 
general assignments to resume for at least 24 months”.). 
 50. Memorandum from Nancy Griswold, Chief Administrative Law Judge, Dept. of Health & 
Human Servs., to OMHA Medicare Appellants, at 1 (Dec. 24, 2013), 
http://www.hhs.gov/omha/OMHA%20Medicare%20Appellant%20Forum/letter_to_medicare_appell
ants_from_the_calj.pdf [hereinafter Griswold, Moratorium Memorandum]. 
 51. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Mandamus Relief at 3, Baxter Reg. Hosp. et. 
al. v. Sebelius, No. 14-cv-851 (D.D.C. filed May 22, 2014),  http://www.aha.org/content/14/ 
140522complaint-appeals.pdf [hereinafter Baxter Complaint]. 
 52. Megan Multack & Claire Noel-Miller, Who Relies on Medicare? Profile of the Medicare 
Population, AARP PUB. POL. INST., (Jan. 2014), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ 
research/public_policy_institute/health/2014/who-relies-on-medicare-fact-sheet-2014-AARP-ppi-
health.pdf.  For example, even a single “health system/appellant may comprise more than 100 
hospitals.”  Steven Greenspan, Frequent Filers: Scapegoats for the Appeals Backlog?, RAC 
MONITOR (June 17, 2015), http://www.racmonitor.com/rac-enews/1846-frequent-filers-scapegoats-
for-the-appeals-backlog.html. 
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patients.53  Smaller providers may face bankruptcy, while larger providers 
will experience disruptions to cash flow.54  Overall, the appeals backlog is 
obstructing funds that should be dedicated to sustaining the hospital 
infrastructure necessary to provide quality patient care. 
Providers are outraged by the backlog and moratorium.  Ninety-eight 
organizations sent a letter to Chief ALJ Nancy Griswold “urg[ing] OMHA to 
develop a comprehensive solution to the Medicare appeal backlog problem” 
because “the numerous appeals requirements, actual costs of filing appeals 
and often lengthy delays undermine the ability of physicians to deliver 
patient-centered care.”55  Health care professionals expressed concerns that 
the moratorium is creating harm for both patients and providers, and only 
“perpetuates the backlog that eliminates the statutory schedule of appeal 
reviews.”56  One hundred eleven members of Congress signed a letter issued 
to Secretary Sebelius, asking her to consider dedicating additional resources 
to help resolve the backlog and to implement reforms, such as restructuring 
the RAC process and providing more transparent mechanisms of informing 
providers of errors so that they can be avoided in the future.57 
D.  Recent Litigation 
The moratorium has also prompted several high-profile lawsuits, 
including a federal class action suit filed by the Center for Medicare 
Advocacy (CMA) on behalf of five Medicare beneficiaries, requesting a 
court order requiring the Secretary of HHS to clear the massive backlog of 
ALJ appeals.58  Similarly, the AHA filed suit against the Secretary of HHS 
in federal district court, seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the secretary 
to process their administrative appeals in accordance with statutory 
deadlines.59  One plaintiff stated that Medicare accounts for 55% of its gross 
 
 53. Greenspan, supra note 52; see, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F.Supp.3d 43 (D.D.C. 
2014). 
 54. Marotti, supra note 39. 
 55. Letter from the American Medical Ass’n et al., to Nancy Griswold, Chief ALJ, Office of 
Medicare Hearings & Appeals (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/ 
advocacy/payment/medicare/LT-HHS-MedicareAppealsBacklog-021214.pdf. 
 56. Letter from Donald May, supra note 47. 
 57. Marotti, supra note 39 
 58. Hettich, supra note 19; Lessler Complaint, supra note 19, at 2.  On behalf of themselves 
and the nationwide class of other Medicare beneficiaries harmed by the backlog, plaintiffs 
challenged the administrative review process as a violation of the Medicare statute and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Id. 
 59. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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revenue, leaving $7.6 million worth of appeals pending in the appeals 
process—$6.6 million of which at the ALJ level.60 Another plaintiff, Baxter 
Regional Medical Center, claimed that it has so much tied up in the appeals 
process that it cannot afford to replace a failing roof over its surgery 
department, purchase new beds for its intensive care unit, engage in basic 
upkeep of its facilities, or purchase necessary capital items.61  Furthermore, 
as a result of the delays, some rehabilitation facilities have been “‘forced to 
avoid admitting certain types of patients’ . . . due to uncertainty about timely 
reimbursement.”62  Plaintiffs contend that because of the nexus between 
these economic consequences and basic human welfare, it is crucial that 
HHS promptly find a solution to reduce the backlog.63 
Under the rationale of In re Barr Labs., Inc.,64 the court recently 
dismissed AHA’s summary judgment motion on jurisdictional grounds, 
stating, “while [the] Court sympathizes with Plaintiffs’ plight, for the time 
being the waiting game must go on.”65  In light of HHS’s higher and 
competing priorities,66 the D.C. Circuit found that HHS’s delay in 
processing administrative appeals was far from ideal, but not so egregious to 
warrant intervention and therefore the court lacked proper subject matter 
jurisdiction.67  Because Congress is well aware of the problem, and Congress 
and the Secretary are the proper agents to resolve it, the court declined the 
invitation for judicial intervention, characterizing such as either an “empty 
 
 60. Complaint at 5, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 14 
Civ. 851), 2014 WL 2532049 [hereinafter AMA Complaint]. 
 61. Id. at 4.  
 62. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 52 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 63. AHA argued that the ultimate consequences for health services and facilities “weigh[] in 
favor of compelling agency action based on unreasonable delay.”  See Muwekma Tribe v. Babbit, 
133 F. Supp. 2d 30, 39 (D.D.C. 2001); Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 750 F.2d 81, 
86 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (determining that the “consequences of non-intervention” factor weighed in 
favor of relief when an agency failed to timely adjudicate claims for unemployment-assistance 
payments). 
 64. In re Barr Labs. Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting a petition for mandamus 
against the Food and Drug Administration for immediate resolution of generic drug applications 
after the FDA consistently violated statutory deadlines by almost 500 days, resulting in fewer 
resources for other aspects of health care).  Barr Labs found that the court had no basis for 
“reordering agency priorities,” and that “[t]he agency is in a unique – and authoritative – position to 
view its projects as a whole, estimate the prospects for each, and allocate its resources in the optimal 
way.”  Id. at 76.  “Such budget flexibility as Congress has allowed the agency is not for [the Court] 
to hijack.”  Id.    
 65. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 66. Id. at 51-53.  “Competing priorities” is merely one of the six non-dispositive factors from 
Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  Id.  Evaluating the 
totality of the circumstances in this case, the court also weighed other TRAC factors including: (1) 
failure to comply with statutory deadlines, (2) consequences of non-intervention, and (3) bad faith.  
Id. 
 67. Id. at 45. 
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gesture” or “judicial overstepping.”68  However, the court left open the 
possibility that the case later shift in the plaintiff’s favor, should HHS and 
Congress fail to adequately address the overflow of appeals.69 
E.  Lack of Alternative Remedies 
The D.C. Circuit’s recent refusal to grant the mandamus is certainly a 
temporary relief to HHS, but the cautionary closing remarks of the judge still 
places pressure on HHS to swiftly implement changes.  And furthermore, the 
Burwell plaintiffs are considering appealing the dismissal.70  This leaves us 
all, including HHS, wondering, what now?  Chief ALJ Griswold has 
conceded that the wait times for ALJ hearings are unacceptable,71 however 
providers have not been offered a comprehensive solution. 
Although appellants have the right to escalate their claims to a MAC if 
the ALJ does not meet the ninety-day requirement, like OMHA, MAC is not 
meeting its statutory deadline for making decisions.72  CMS itself warned 
providers that, “‘escalating would deprive the appellant of an oral hearing     
. . . cause the forfeiture of the ninety-day deadline for the MAC’s decision-
making, and . . . result in a less well developed record.’”73  Essentially, 
OMHA is aware that such is not a viable option for providers.  It is not 
surprising that very few providers are opting for this escalation option—as 
exemplified by the mere nineteen escalations that MACs received from 
OMHA in fiscal year 2014.74 
In response to the federal court alternative, providers contend that 
escalating their claims to federal court is both costly and disadvantageous 
because the court would only have access to the limited record and 
determination by the QIC or the MAC without an unbiased, independent 
ALJ’s finding of fact and conclusions of law.75  In addition to an 
 
 68. Id. at 55. 
 69. Id. at 56. 
 70. Ayla Ellison, Court Dismisses AHA’s Case Over Rejected Inpatient Payments, BECKER’S 
HOSP. CFO, (Sept. 18 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/court-dismisses-aha-s-
case-over-rejected-inpatient-payments.html. 
 71. AMA Complaint, supra note 60, at 12.    
 72. Lessler Complaint, supra note 19, at 18; Medicare Appellant Forum, supra note 34.  Like 
OMHA, the MAC is “unlikely to meet the ninety-day deadline for issuing decisions in most 
appeals.”  Id. 
 73. Hettich, supra note 19. 
 74. Lessler Complaint, supra note 19, at 18-19 (calculating the 2014 fiscal year through 
February 2014). 
 75. AMA Complaint, supra note 60, at 10. 
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undeveloped record, “hospitals must weigh the cost of federal court 
litigation against the total possible recovery,”76 which when considering the 
low amount in controversy requirements, expected recovery can be minimal.  
In many cases hospitals would pay more to litigate their case than they could 
even recover from the Medicare claims.77  Even if some appellants were 
willing to sacrifice their right to an ALJ hearing by escalating to a MAC or 
federal courts, “escalation was not intended to be and could not be a 
wholesale solution for thousands of appellants.”78 
So what kind of solution exists, if any?  Funded through its own 
appropriation,79 HHS remains under tight budgetary constraints and 
competing priorities.  At this time it lacks the adequate resources to redeem 
the necessary momentum to handle the mass production of appeals.  As a 
step in the right direction, OMHA and HHS established a departmental 
interagency workgroup comprised of leaders from CMS, OMHA, and DAB 
to conduct a thorough review of the appeals process and develop initiatives 
that OMHA and CMS can employ to streamline the appeals process.80  In a 
Request for Information, OMHA also sought public-input regarding its 
initiatives to reduce pending appeals and requests for hearings at the ALJ 
level, as well as “suggestions for additional initiatives which could be 
undertaken at OMHA to address the appeals workload.”81  Though not a 
“cure-all” solution to the appeal disaster, one non-traditional forum—
alternative dispute resolution—stands out as an innovative approach to 
addressing the backlog while attending to the concerns of the providers. 
II.  INTEGRATING MEDIATION IN RESPONSE TO THE BACKLOG 
The initial levels of the appeal-review process are designed as a power-
based conflict resolution method where parties are simply awarded or denied 
reimbursement through the unilateral decision of the reviewer.  
Distinguishably, alternative dispute resolution—and particularly 
mediation—promotes effective communication of the party’s positions and 
 
 76. Id. at 16. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Lessler Complaint, supra note 19, at 18. 
 79. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 80. Griswold Statement, supra note 42.  OMHA reported 800,000 unprocessed appeals as of 
July 1, 2014.  Id.  The departmental interagency initiatives are discussed in Part II(C) of this article.  
See infra. 
 81. Medicare Program; Administrative Law Judge Hearing Program for Medicare Claim 
Appeals, 79 Fed. Reg. 214, 65661 (Nov. 5, 2014).  OMHA submitted a request for information 
issued in the November 5, 2014 Federal Register.  Id. 
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encourages settlement negotiations through a more collaborative lens.82  
Providers are currently employing a more distributive approach, focusing 
primarily on financial alternatives to rectify the appeals situation.  For 
example, the plaintiffs in Burwell contend that the Secretary of HHS could 
avail herself of funds within HHS to hire more ALJs, seek greater 
appropriations for OMHA, terminate the RAC program, or simply 
“reprogram” funds.83  Instead, providers should be capitalizing on alternative 
dispute resolution as a more promising, integrative approach, which if 
applied in conjunction with other structural changes, could ease the current 
dilemma and support a more feasible appeals process for the future. 
Although in terms of success rate, arbitration is considered 100% 
successful, surveys reveal an actual success rate84 of about 80%.85  In the 
instant case, OMHA would be asking parties to agree to accommodations 
due to the dysfunctions of the Medicare appeal system—a system with 
setbacks beyond the control of providers.  Modifying an established, yet 
faulty, appeals process and forcing providers into a different binding, non-
collaborative decision would be an arbitrary exercise of Medicare’s power.  
Thus, under the particular circumstances of the backlog, arbitration is not the 
best forum, and OMHA should focus on integrating mediation as the 
primary conflict-resolution method. 
A.  Advantages of Mediation 
There are several distinctive advantages of mediation that, if properly 
implemented, could offer remedies to providers stranded at the ALJ level.  
For one, merely as a matter of system design, a non-stakeholder brings 
confidence in the mediation process itself because, unlike the MAC 
representatives or the QIC that usually oversees the appeals, the neutral 
mediator is neither an employee of OMHA nor a designated provider-
representative.86  Rather, a trained and disinterested third-party typically 
assists in the mediation’s communication process, which allows the parties 
to more effectively understand the controversies and come to an agreement 
 
 82. R. Wayne Thorpe, Effective Use of Mediation and Arbitration in Health Care Disputes, 
BLOOMBERG L. REP. (2011), http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Articles/Thorpe-
Healthcare-Disputes-Bloomberg-2011.pdf. 
 83. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 84. Referring to the satisfaction of both parties. 
 85. Garylee Cox, The Appropriate Arena for ADA Disputes: Arbitration or Mediation?, J. 
C.R. & ECON. DEV. 591, 594 (1995). 
 86. Phyllis E. Bernard, Mediating with an 800-Pound Gorilla: Medicare and ADR, 60 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1417, 1421 (2003) [hereinafter Bernard, Medicare and ADR]. 
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through their respective self-determinations.  Because mediation would 
integrate providers directly into the process, it may empower providers to 
more readily reach a result.  Unlike a typical black-and-white written appeal 
where providers are simply given a brief reason why the claim was or was 
not overturned, mediation tends to lead to settlements that all parties are 
genuinely, and lastingly at peace with, much because they were a part of 
both the process and the outcome.87  By opening dialogue between providers 
and OMHA representatives, the parties could identify shared values, 
acknowledge the relative strengths and weaknesses of their positions, and 
clarify poorly managed expectations so that future services can be adapted to 
meet the underlying needs of both parties.  Mediation would engage OMHA 
in conversations directly with providers, encouraging representatives to 
actually listen to providers’ current practices, challenges, and concerns.  This 
may also provide helpful instruction to parties, particularly those who submit 
large amounts of Medicare claims, because it may offer a more holistic 
understanding of how to handle multiple appeals and mitigate similar types 
of disputes with future claims.  This is especially important to providers 
because their post-backlog claims continue to pool while they await the 
adjudication process.  In time, OMHA and providers would save the 
resources and time it currently spends entertaining denied claims, and 
instead preserve such costs for future claims through the more informed 
knowledge gained by the mediation process. 
In regards to efficiency, a mediator can facilitate swift resolution at 
materially reduced costs and with a greater finality than disputes in the 
judicial or appeal-review systems.88  Some parties believe the informality of 
mediation, namely the absence of procedural and evidentiary rules, promotes 
candid communication and problem solving that leads to efficiency.89  
Though some describe health care mediation as “labor-intensive” and 
“burdensome” for both parties,90 fighting multiple appeals or simply waiting 
years for a claim to be addressed is far more oppressive.  Considering the 
circumstances, providers with a more urgent need for a remedy should at 
least have an option to monitor and address their claims until the ALJs can 
regain control over their dockets.  Because of the limited number of ALJs 
 
 87. Dan Simon, 5 Reasons It’s Hard for Mediators to Support Self-Determination, INST. FOR 
THE STUDY OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION (Nov. 10, 2014), 
http://www.transformativemediation.org/2014/11/10/5-reasons-hard-mediators-support-self-
determination/.  Active participation in both the process and outcome separates mediation from other 
forms of conflict resolution.  For example, “[i]n mediation, the mediator controls the process, the 
parties control the outcome.  In arbitration, the parties control the design of the process and the 
arbitrator controls the outcome.  In litigation, the court controls both the process and the outcome.”  
Cox, supra note 85, at 594. 
 88. Thorpe, supra note 82. 
 89. Bernard, Medicare and ADR, supra note 86, at 1431. 
 90. Id. at 1432. 
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available to resolve the magnitude of stagnant claims, this alternative dispute 
resolution option would allow providers to appeal certain Medicare claims 
decisions in a timely manner, and would successfully alleviate the workload 
of ALJs.  Additionally, a mediation settlement is typically memorialized into 
a binding contract that is enforceable in court under traditional contract law 
principles.91  If the parties reach a settlement, the finality of the mediation 
agreements would reduce the need to resort to ALJ, DAB, QIC, and federal 
court escalation, and thus reduce the exorbitant volume of appeals at those 
levels. 
Fortunately, the positions and circumstances surrounding this backlog 
make appellants and OMHA optimal adversaries for employing this 
alternative dispute resolution method.  Mediation works best “when 
providers are sophisticated, institutional entities with legal representation 
present at the negotiations, principles of law are not central to resolving the 
dispute, perceptions of facts are more important than the law, and personal 
credibility and trustworthiness are essential to the use of a flexible approach 
in resolving the dispute.”92  Here, the providers most affected by the backlog 
consist of institutionalized hospitals and health agencies that are likely to 
present competent legal representation at mediation.  Medicare appeals can 
be driven by the factual details surrounding a hospital’s perception of the 
service versus Medicare’s perception of its necessity.  Thus, these 
circumstantial types of appeals are well suited for mediation.  In addition, 
providers are more likely to trust the attending OMHA representative if 
presented the opportunity to discuss the party’s adverse positions and come 
to a mutual the appeals process,93 and although many would prefer to 
interact directly with ALJ’s, considering the circumstances, a qualified 
mediator may still be an attractive option for providers who wish to have an 
opportunity for that real-time dialogue and accelerated results. 
B.  Potential Mediation Program Structure 
OMHA could reconfigure the appeals process to include alternative 
dispute resolution in a variety of ways, however it is still wise to preserve 
the overall appellate body.  It is important to note that mediation is merely a 
suggestion for easing the number of appeals, and it should be combined with 
concurrent efforts to reconfigure the process—perhaps most importantly, in 
 
 91. Edna Sussman & Conna A. Weiner, Striving for a “Bulletproof’ Mediation Settlement 
Agreement, 33 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 49, 60 (April 2015). 
 92. Bernard, Medicare and ADR, supra note 86, at 1438.  
 93. Lerman, supra note 25.  
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conjunction with RAC-program changes.94  That being said, mediation 
would prove to be a powerful tool for both OMHA and providers. 
One option, as discussed above, would be for OMHA to adopt a 
completely voluntary method of readdressing denied claims, where 
providers would enter the mediation entirely at their sole discretion.  
Although this model would guarantee that parties are committed and likely 
to reach a settlement, it would be difficult for OMHA to recruit a significant 
number of appellants willing to voluntarily enter, and thus this model would 
only make a small dent in the massive backlog.  In the alternative, OMHA 
could place dollar limits mandating alternative dispute resolution, at least at 
some level.  Many health care professionals seem to believe that matters of 
$50,000 or less are most likely to be negotiated since it is difficult to justify 
pursing disputes of that size in light of the high cost of case-preparation and 
federal court litigation.95  Generally, people are most likely to settle cases 
“when larger dollar amounts are at stake and there is room for both sides to 
give something and still leave the negotiations satisfied with what they 
take.”96  This feature is unique to mediation because, in a standard Medicare 
appeal, one party leaves satisfied and the other the “loser.”  By mandating 
mediation among a significant number of claims, OMHA could ensure that 
neither side of the dispute is viewed as “weaker” for accepting mediation 
over pursuing litigation or weathering the ALJ delay.  Instilling this power 
balance would hopefully ease compliance among parties and positively 
impact the backlog.  It is also important to note that “mandating” mediation 
at some level does not force parties into an agreement; rather it forces parties 
into a conversation about an agreement.  With that in mind, it would be 
important that both voluntary and mandated parties to a mediation maintain 
their position at the ALJ level so that they can enter mediation without 
coercion or pressure. 
C.  OMHA’s Pilot Program 
OMHA apparently agrees that mediation may be the predominant 
solution to the delays, recently announcing its plans to launch a mediation 
pilot program of its own.97  Providers were pleased to hear that OMHA is in 
 
 94. Potential RAC-program changes include: curtailing the number of RACs, modifying how 
the RACs are paid, creating disincentives for overturned claims later reversed on appeal, requiring 
providers to pay a fee for each claim appealed to discourage non-meritorious appeals, and 
transitioning to electronic submission of documents. 
 95. Phyllis E. Bernard, Empowering the Provider: A Better Way to Resolve Medicare Hospital 
Payment Disputes, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 340 (Jan. 1997), available at http://works.bepress.com/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=phyllis_bernard [hereinafter Bernard, Empowering the 
Provider]. 
 96. Id. at 340. 
 97. Lerman, supra note 25 (stating that the pilots launched in July 2014). 
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the process of developing programs to help combat the appeals workload, 
one of which being the “facilitated settlement conference” conducted by 
OMHA attorneys who have been trained in dispute resolution techniques.98  
The facilitated settlement conference is basically a mediation confined to 
particular terms and conditions created by OMHA, but generally, it follows a 
mediation model.99  The conference is offered to providers with at least 
twenty Medicare Part B appeals filed in 2013 that are still awaiting an ALJ 
assignment, or with a value of services totaling at least $10,000.100  In order 
to request a settlement conference, providers must include all the same types 
of claims at the ALJ level.101 
Just as a mediator would serve as a neutral third-party, the facilitator in 
the proposed conference facilitation would not make official determinations 
on the merits of a claim at issue, nor would they serve as a fact-finder, like 
an ALJ would.102  The settlement conference program sets forth a standard 
voluntary agreement, where a facilitator will draft a settlement document 
reflecting the agreement, and the appellant and CMS sign the document 
during the conference session.103  The program specifies that by reaching a 
settlement agreement, an appellant’s request for an ALJ hearing is then 
dismissed.104  And if the mediation does not lead to a mutually agreeable 
 
 98. Statement by Nancy J. Griswold, supra note 42.  A “Statistical Sampling Initiative” is also 
being offered as part of the pilot program, which consists of using statistical sampling to draw a 
random sample of claims and extrapolating the sample results to that large volume of claim disputes 
at the ALJ level.  Jessica Gustafson & Abby Pendleton, (Partial) Relief in Sight: CMS Proposes 
Settlement of Pending Inpatient Hospital “Status” Appeals, AMERICANBAR.ORG (Oct. 2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/aba_health_esource/2014-2015/october/partial.html.  CMS 
has also agreed to pay any hospital that withdraws pending appeals a partial payment (68%) of the 
net allowable amount.  Id.  
 99. Settlement Conference Facilitation, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/omha/OMHA%20Settlement%20Conference%20Facilitation/settlement_confer
ence_facilitation.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (“The settlement conference facilitator uses 
mediation principles to assist the appellant and CMS in working toward a mutually agreeable 
resolution.”)  Id. 
 100. Steven Meyerson, HHS Pilots Alternatives to Medicare Appeals Bottleneck, ACCRETIVE 
HEALTH BLOG, (Aug. 5, 2014), http://accretivehealth.com/hhs-pilots-alternatives-to-medicare-
appeals-bottleneck/. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Debra McCurdy, HHS “Settlement Conference Facilitation” Pilot Provides Alternative to 
ALJ Hearing, HEALTH INDUS. WASH. WATCH (July 25, 2014), http://www.healthindustrywashington 
watch.com/2014/07/articles/other-health-policy-developments/other-hhs-developments/hhs-
settlement-conference-facilitation-pilot-provides-alternative-to-alj-hearing. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Chuck Buck, Mixed Reviews Greet Settlement Conference Facilitation Pilot, RAC 
MONITOR (July 17, 2014), http://racmonitor.com/rac-enews/1697-mixed-reviews-greet-settlement-
conference-facilitation-pilot.html. 
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resolution during the conference, then the claims are placed back into the 
ALJ assignment waitlist in the same position that it was originally placed.105  
Chief ALJ Nancy Griswold stated that “OMHA will be monitoring the 
performance of th[e] pilots and, if successful, will roll them out nationally as 
funding allows.”106 
But so far, OMHA is seeing underwhelming participation and success in 
the program.  In a 2014 survey, only 2% of respondents eligible for one of 
the pilot programs planned to participate, 7% firmly did not plan to use it at 
all, and 50% were undecided.107  In a subsequent follow-up poll, 3% of 
eligible respondents reported that they planned to use the pilots, while 16% 
did not wish to take advantage of the alternative.108  So what is it about the 
conference’s design that is troubling providers? 
D.  Challenges of the Proposed Pilot Program 
Unfortunately for OMHA, most providers are not taking advantage of 
the facilitated settlement conference alternative for a variety of reasons.  
First, by the program’s own terms, many providers remain excluded from 
participating—and stunted participation raises skepticism about the impact-
potential of implementing this form of mediation.  As the program stands 
now, the proposed settlement conference is limited to such a small subset of 
appeals, mainly Medicare Part B claims appealed at the ALJ level,109 but not 
hospitals’ inpatient medical necessity claims.110  Medicare Part A, C, D, and 
several other types of appeals are simply not eligible for the 
process.111  Furthermore, providers are discouraged by the extensive 
requirements that at least twenty claims or $10,000 worth of appeals must be 
pending assignment to an ALJ, or if fewer, each individual claim is less than 
$100,000.112  In addition to the types of Medicare claims accepted, these 
requirements preclude an even larger volume of providers from participating 
in the process.  As a result, the program lacks the force to have an immediate 
or drastic impact on the backlog. 
It is also fair that providers question whether OMHA’s resources will 
allow it to process their requests for participation in the program in a timely 
 
 105. Lerman, supra note 25. 
 106. Griswold Statement, supra note 42. 
 107. Meyerson, supra note 100. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Inside CMS: OMHA Mediation Pilot Puts CMS, Part B Providers Together To Resolve 
Appeals, INSIDE HEALTH POL’Y (July 11, 2014), http://medicareintegrity.org/inside-cms-omha-
mediation-pilot-puts-cms-part-b-providers-together-to-resolve-appeals. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Meyerson, supra note 100; Buck, supra note 104. 
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and accurate manner given their preoccupation with the current claims in the 
appellate process.  If participants agree to save OMHA administrative costs 
and essentially shift responsibility back to providers, then in return, 
providers are going to expect faster progress than that of a standard appeal.  
As discussed above, parties engaging in mediation are looking for swift 
resolution at materially-reduced costs and with greater finality—and the 
facilitated settlement conference is no exception. 
Moreover, the proposed pilot program states that the settlement 
conference facilitator will be an employee of OMHA,113 which although a 
separate agency from CMS, is a component of the HHS Office of the 
Secretary.  In mediation, it is essential that safeguards protect the neutrality 
of the alternative dispute resolution intervention.114  But here, the closely 
related interests of the mediator (or in this case, the “facilitator”) and their 
employer likely raise provider-concerns regarding conflicts of interest and 
whether providers will actually be heard in the conference.  The impartiality 
of the mediator is a crucial element of mediation, setting the non-adversarial 
tone for the discussion and empowering the parties to trust in the process.  
Without a neutral third-party, the process is broken by perceived power 
imbalances and a lack of autonomy.  And without equal footing, coercion 
may infiltrate the structure of the mediation.115  One alternative dispute 
resolution critic warns that in these types of negotiations, “consent is often 
coerced; . . . although dockets may be trimmed, justice may not be done.”116  
Though caustic, it is plausible that by employing OMHA’s own attorneys to 
mediate the conferences, these negotiations may dupe providers into settling 
for inequitable compromises.117 
This power imbalance is only heightened by the likelihood that most 
providers voluntarily engaging in the conference are doing so because they 
are financially pressed.  In the context of this mediation setting, they are 
considered the “poorer party.”  A poorer party may be induced to 
 
 113. Meyerson, supra note 100. 
 114. Impartiality in Mediation, THE MEDIATION PRAC. (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.mediationpractice.ie/ resources/item/impartiality-in-mediation. 
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expeditiously settle notwithstanding a belief that they are receiving less now 
than if they awaited actual judgment on the appeal.118  Additionally, the 
poorer party may be forced to settle simply because they do not have the 
resources119 to allocate towards waiting-out the backlog or financing 
litigation, particularly when the value of the appeal is limited. 
OMHA’s settlement conference specifies that in choosing to enter 
settlement with CMS, the provider must give-up all future appeal rights.120  
Because multiple claims for the same service are required to be held at a 
group hearing,121 providers are placed at a serious disadvantage.  In other 
words, the provider must bundle all like-services together and mediate every 
one of those claims in the aggregate—so either “win big or lose big.”122  
Considering the latent power imbalance discussed above, if a provider 
chooses this settlement conference option and settles for a loss on the group 
of claims, even if coerced, they forfeit all future appeal rights on every claim 
contained within the group—which is never a good move.123 
Luckily for OMHA, all of the aforementioned faults can be recast in 
terms of procedural technicalities and design.  However, OMHA still faces 
enveloping challenges in applying mediation to this appeals setting.  It will 
be difficult to streamline settlement decisions across such a diverse range of 
claims, parties, and mediators.  Particularly because these mediations are not 
adjudicated by a specialized and neutral ALJ, parties need assurance that the 
facilitated settlement conference will carry substantial predictability and 
uniformity.  The institutionalized mediation scheme must allow providers to 
reasonably rely on its predictability so that they can make realistic plans in 
their best interest. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
On a macro-scale, the backlog has strained providers by depriving them 
of the funds that supplement their ability to provide quality patient services.  
With the rise of baby-boomers reaching Medicare-qualification age and 
increased Medicare access via Social Securities Disability Insurance, the 
 
 118. Bernard, Medicare and ADR, supra note 95, at 1429. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Buck, supra note 104. 
 121. Andrew B. Wachler et al., Recently Unveiled Pilot Programs Provide Alternative Methods 
for Resolving Medicare Claim Appeals, AM. BAR ASS’N HEALTH ESOURCE (Aug. 2014) 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/aba_health_esource/2013-14/august/pilot_programs.html.  
“[T]he Settlement Conference Facilitation request must include all of the provider’s eligible claims 
for the same item or service regardless of whether the claims were included in separate ALJ hearing 
requests (i.e., providers may not submit a [Settlement Conference Facilitation] request for some 
eligible claims and proceed to the ALJ hearing for the remaining eligible claims).”  Id. 
 122. Buck, supra note 104. 
 123. Id. 
20
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol16/iss1/3
 [Vol. 16: 61, 2016] The Medicare Appeals Crisis 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
81 
upturn in appeals is unlikely to wane any time soon.  OMHA’s budget was 
increased from $69 million to $82.3 million over the past 2014-2015 fiscal 
year.124  In the U.S. Senate Finance Committee’s April 2015 hearing to 
address the Medicare appeal backlog, ALJ Nancy Griswold claimed that the 
boost in resources was still not enough.125  On February 2, 2015, President 
Obama released his fiscal year 2016 budget proposal, which proposed to 
award over $1 trillion to HHS126 and increase OMHA’s budget by $300 
million127 for the purpose of ensuring the Medicare program’s integrity 
without placing undue burdens on providers.128  This proposal would solicit 
exorbitant amounts of taxpayer dollars towards only a partial solution to the 
backlog, while holding a burden on providers to pursue a frustrating appeal 
process.  Indeed, the funds would enable OMHA to hire a greater number of 
ALJs to handle the appeals.129  However the circumstances require a far 
more comprehensive remedy than merely throwing $1 trillion at the 
problem.  Considering the economical value of mediation, these funds could 
instead be more effectively allocated to a modified version of OMHA’s 
Facilitated Settlement Conference at only a fraction of the cost of bolstering 
the original program design.  Perhaps even at the initial level of appeals, 
alternative dispute resolution could streamline access to subsequent appeal 
levels.  OMHA should be employing mediation, not just money, to mitigate 
the disastrous number of stagnant appeals at the ALJ level, while leaving 
taxpayer funds to other health care and federal expenditures that lack such a 
pragmatic alternative. 
The settlement conference at least invites providers to engage with 
OMHA in a non-binding, open environment, which is a comparable 
alternative to the live ALJ hearing so adored by providers.  Although the 
pilot program is far from perfect, it is after all, a “pilot” project and can be 
subjected to modification or termination at any time.  It is clear that 
providers are weary of the program as it stands now, however if OMHA 
modified the facilitated settlement conference to capitalize on some of the 
benefits of standard mediation practices, such as neutral third-party 
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mediators, mandated assignments, and broadened inclusion of additional 
Medicare claims, mediation could be just the dose of medicine the appeals 
crisis needs. 
 
22
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol16/iss1/3
